You can still force the logo in the normal logs.
For motivations, check issue #3112. For me the reason is that actually
the logo is nice to have in interactive sessions, but inside the logs
kinda loses its usefulness, but for the ability of users to recognize
restarts easily: for this reason the new startup sequence shows a one
liner ASCII "wave" so that there is still a bit of visual clue.
Startup logging was modified in order to log events in more obvious
ways, and to log more events. Also certain important informations are
now more easy to parse/grep since they are printed in field=value style.
The option --always-show-logo in redis.conf was added, defaulting to no.
The new algorithm provides the same speed with a smaller error for
cardinalities in the range 0-100k. Before switching, the new and old
algorithm behavior was studied in details in the context of
issue #3677. You can find a few graphs and motivations there.
This commit fixes a vunlerability reported by Cory Duplantis
of Cisco Talos, see TALOS-2016-0206 for reference.
CONFIG SET client-output-buffer-limit accepts as client class "master"
which is actually only used to implement CLIENT KILL. The "master" class
has ID 3. What happens is that the global structure:
server.client_obuf_limits[class]
Is accessed with class = 3. However it is a 3 elements array, so writing
the 4th element means to write up to 24 bytes of memory *after* the end
of the array, since the structure is defined as:
typedef struct clientBufferLimitsConfig {
unsigned long long hard_limit_bytes;
unsigned long long soft_limit_bytes;
time_t soft_limit_seconds;
} clientBufferLimitsConfig;
EVALUATION OF IMPACT:
Checking what's past the boundaries of the array in the global
'server' structure, we find AOF state fields:
clientBufferLimitsConfig client_obuf_limits[CLIENT_TYPE_OBUF_COUNT];
/* AOF persistence */
int aof_state; /* AOF_(ON|OFF|WAIT_REWRITE) */
int aof_fsync; /* Kind of fsync() policy */
char *aof_filename; /* Name of the AOF file */
int aof_no_fsync_on_rewrite; /* Don't fsync if a rewrite is in prog. */
int aof_rewrite_perc; /* Rewrite AOF if % growth is > M and... */
off_t aof_rewrite_min_size; /* the AOF file is at least N bytes. */
off_t aof_rewrite_base_size; /* AOF size on latest startup or rewrite. */
off_t aof_current_size; /* AOF current size. */
Writing to most of these fields should be harmless and only cause problems in
Redis persistence that should not escalate to security problems.
However unfortunately writing to "aof_filename" could be potentially a
security issue depending on the access pattern.
Searching for "aof.filename" accesses in the source code returns many different
usages of the field, including using it as input for open(), logging to the
Redis log file or syslog, and calling the rename() syscall.
It looks possible that attacks could lead at least to informations
disclosure of the state and data inside Redis. However note that the
attacker must already have access to the server. But, worse than that,
it looks possible that being able to change the AOF filename can be used
to mount more powerful attacks: like overwriting random files with AOF
data (easily a potential security issue as demostrated here:
http://antirez.com/news/96), or even more subtle attacks where the
AOF filename is changed to a path were a malicious AOF file is loaded
in order to exploit other potential issues when the AOF parser is fed
with untrusted input (no known issue known currently).
The fix checks the places where the 'master' class is specifiedf in
order to access configuration data structures, and return an error in
this cases.
WHO IS AT RISK?
The "master" client class was introduced in Redis in Jul 28 2015.
Every Redis instance released past this date is not vulnerable
while all the releases after this date are. Notably:
Redis 3.0.x is NOT vunlerable.
Redis 3.2.x IS vulnerable.
Redis unstable is vulnerable.
In order for the instance to be at risk, at least one of the following
conditions must be true:
1. The attacker can access Redis remotely and is able to send
the CONFIG SET command (often banned in managed Redis instances).
2. The attacker is able to control the "redis.conf" file and
can wait or trigger a server restart.
The problem was fixed 26th September 2016 in all the releases affected.
This feature is useful, especially in deployments using Sentinel in
order to setup Redis HA, where the slave is executed with NAT or port
forwarding, so that the auto-detected port/ip addresses, as listed in
the "INFO replication" output of the master, or as provided by the
"ROLE" command, don't match the real addresses at which the slave is
reachable for connections.
I've renamed maxmemoryToString to evictPolicyToString since that is
more accurate (and easier to mentally connect with the correct data), as
well as updated the function to user server.maxmemory_policy rather than
server.maxmemory. Now with a default config it is actually returning
the correct policy rather than volatile-lru.
An exposed Redis instance on the internet can be cause of serious
issues. Since Redis, by default, binds to all the interfaces, it is easy
to forget an instance without any protection layer, for error.
Protected mode try to address this feature in a soft way, providing a
layer of protection, but giving clues to Redis users about why the
server is not accepting connections.
When protected mode is enabeld (the default), and if there are no
minumum hints about the fact the server is properly configured (no
"bind" directive is used in order to restrict the server to certain
interfaces, nor a password is set), clients connecting from external
intefaces are refused with an error explaining what to do in order to
fix the issue.
Clients connecting from the IPv4 and IPv6 lookback interfaces are still
accepted normally, similarly Unix domain socket connections are not
restricted in any way.
Not perfect since The Solution IMHO is to have a DSL with a table of
configuration functions with type, limits, and aux functions to handle
the odd ones. However this hacky macro solution is already better and
forces to put limits in the range of numerical fields.
More field types to be refactored in the next commits hopefully.
Adds configuration option 'supervised [no | upstart | systemd | auto]'
Also removed 'bzero' from the previous implementation because it's 2015.
(We could actually statically initialize those structs, but clang
throws an invalid warning when we try, so it looks bad even though it
isn't bad.)
Fixes#2264
This removes:
- list-max-ziplist-entries
- list-max-ziplist-value
This adds:
- list-max-ziplist-size
- list-compress-depth
Also updates config file with new sections and updates
tests to use quicklist settings instead of old list settings.
