2019-01-28 05:39:58 -05:00
|
|
|
start_server {tags {"acl"}} {
|
|
|
|
test {Connections start with the default user} {
|
|
|
|
r ACL WHOAMI
|
|
|
|
} {default}
|
2019-01-28 05:44:10 -05:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
test {It is possible to create new users} {
|
|
|
|
r ACL setuser newuser
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
test {New users start disabled} {
|
|
|
|
r ACL setuser newuser >passwd1
|
|
|
|
catch {r AUTH newuser passwd1} err
|
|
|
|
set err
|
|
|
|
} {*WRONGPASS*}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
test {Enabling the user allows the login} {
|
2019-01-28 06:06:25 -05:00
|
|
|
r ACL setuser newuser on +acl
|
2019-01-28 05:44:10 -05:00
|
|
|
r AUTH newuser passwd1
|
2019-01-28 06:06:25 -05:00
|
|
|
r ACL WHOAMI
|
|
|
|
} {newuser}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
test {Only the set of correct passwords work} {
|
|
|
|
r ACL setuser newuser >passwd2
|
|
|
|
catch {r AUTH newuser passwd1} e
|
|
|
|
assert {$e eq "OK"}
|
|
|
|
catch {r AUTH newuser passwd2} e
|
|
|
|
assert {$e eq "OK"}
|
|
|
|
catch {r AUTH newuser passwd3} e
|
|
|
|
set e
|
|
|
|
} {*WRONGPASS*}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
test {It is possible to remove passwords from the set of valid ones} {
|
|
|
|
r ACL setuser newuser <passwd1
|
|
|
|
catch {r AUTH newuser passwd1} e
|
|
|
|
set e
|
|
|
|
} {*WRONGPASS*}
|
2019-01-28 06:33:14 -05:00
|
|
|
|
2019-09-17 06:32:35 -04:00
|
|
|
test {Test password hashes can be added} {
|
|
|
|
r ACL setuser newuser #34344e4d60c2b6d639b7bd22e18f2b0b91bc34bf0ac5f9952744435093cfb4e6
|
|
|
|
catch {r AUTH newuser passwd4} e
|
|
|
|
assert {$e eq "OK"}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
test {Test password hashes validate input} {
|
|
|
|
# Validate Length
|
|
|
|
catch {r ACL setuser newuser #34344e4d60c2b6d639b7bd22e18f2b0b91bc34bf0ac5f9952744435093cfb4e} e
|
|
|
|
# Validate character outside set
|
|
|
|
catch {r ACL setuser newuser #34344e4d60c2b6d639b7bd22e18f2b0b91bc34bf0ac5f9952744435093cfb4eq} e
|
|
|
|
set e
|
|
|
|
} {*Error in ACL SETUSER modifier*}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
test {ACL GETUSER returns the password hash instead of the actual password} {
|
|
|
|
set passstr [dict get [r ACL getuser newuser] passwords]
|
|
|
|
assert_match {*34344e4d60c2b6d639b7bd22e18f2b0b91bc34bf0ac5f9952744435093cfb4e6*} $passstr
|
|
|
|
assert_no_match {*passwd4*} $passstr
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2019-09-30 12:22:55 -04:00
|
|
|
test {Test hashed passwords removal} {
|
|
|
|
r ACL setuser newuser !34344e4d60c2b6d639b7bd22e18f2b0b91bc34bf0ac5f9952744435093cfb4e6
|
|
|
|
set passstr [dict get [r ACL getuser newuser] passwords]
|
|
|
|
assert_no_match {*34344e4d60c2b6d639b7bd22e18f2b0b91bc34bf0ac5f9952744435093cfb4e6*} $passstr
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2019-01-28 06:33:14 -05:00
|
|
|
test {By default users are not able to access any command} {
|
|
|
|
catch {r SET foo bar} e
|
|
|
|
set e
|
|
|
|
} {*NOPERM*}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
test {By default users are not able to access any key} {
|
|
|
|
r ACL setuser newuser +set
|
|
|
|
catch {r SET foo bar} e
|
|
|
|
set e
|
|
|
|
} {*NOPERM*key*}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
test {It's possible to allow the access of a subset of keys} {
|
|
|
|
r ACL setuser newuser allcommands ~foo:* ~bar:*
|
|
|
|
r SET foo:1 a
|
|
|
|
r SET bar:2 b
|
|
|
|
catch {r SET zap:3 c} e
|
|
|
|
r ACL setuser newuser allkeys; # Undo keys ACL
|
|
|
|
set e
|
|
|
|
} {*NOPERM*key*}
|
2019-01-28 06:40:07 -05:00
|
|
|
|
Adds pub/sub channel patterns to ACL (#7993)
Fixes #7923.
This PR appropriates the special `&` symbol (because `@` and `*` are taken),
followed by a literal value or pattern for describing the Pub/Sub patterns that
an ACL user can interact with. It is similar to the existing key patterns
mechanism in function (additive) and implementation (copy-pasta). It also adds
the allchannels and resetchannels ACL keywords, naturally.
The default user is given allchannels permissions, whereas new users get
whatever is defined by the acl-pubsub-default configuration directive. For
backward compatibility in 6.2, the default of this directive is allchannels but
this is likely to be changed to resetchannels in the next major version for
stronger default security settings.
Unless allchannels is set for the user, channel access permissions are checked
as follows :
* Calls to both PUBLISH and SUBSCRIBE will fail unless a pattern matching the
argumentative channel name(s) exists for the user.
* Calls to PSUBSCRIBE will fail unless the pattern(s) provided as an argument
literally exist(s) in the user's list.
Such failures are logged to the ACL log.
Runtime changes to channel permissions for a user with existing subscribing
clients cause said clients to disconnect unless the new permissions permit the
connections to continue. Note, however, that PSUBSCRIBErs' patterns are matched
literally, so given the change bar:* -> b*, pattern subscribers to bar:* will be
disconnected.
Notes/questions:
* UNSUBSCRIBE, PUNSUBSCRIBE and PUBSUB remain unprotected due to lack of reasons
for touching them.
2020-12-01 07:21:39 -05:00
|
|
|
test {By default users are able to publish to any channel} {
|
|
|
|
r ACL setuser psuser on >pspass +acl +client +@pubsub
|
|
|
|
r AUTH psuser pspass
|
|
|
|
r PUBLISH foo bar
|
|
|
|
} {0}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
test {By default users are able to subscribe to any channel} {
|
|
|
|
set rd [redis_deferring_client]
|
|
|
|
$rd AUTH psuser pspass
|
|
|
|
$rd read
|
|
|
|
$rd SUBSCRIBE foo
|
|
|
|
assert_match {subscribe foo 1} [$rd read]
|
|
|
|
$rd close
|
|
|
|
} {0}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
test {By default users are able to subscribe to any pattern} {
|
|
|
|
set rd [redis_deferring_client]
|
|
|
|
$rd AUTH psuser pspass
|
|
|
|
$rd read
|
|
|
|
$rd PSUBSCRIBE bar*
|
|
|
|
assert_match {psubscribe bar\* 1} [$rd read]
|
|
|
|
$rd close
|
|
|
|
} {0}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
test {It's possible to allow publishing to a subset of channels} {
|
|
|
|
r ACL setuser psuser resetchannels &foo:1 &bar:*
|
|
|
|
assert_equal {0} [r PUBLISH foo:1 somemessage]
|
|
|
|
assert_equal {0} [r PUBLISH bar:2 anothermessage]
|
|
|
|
catch {r PUBLISH zap:3 nosuchmessage} e
|
|
|
|
set e
|
|
|
|
} {*NOPERM*channel*}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
test {It's possible to allow subscribing to a subset of channels} {
|
|
|
|
set rd [redis_deferring_client]
|
|
|
|
$rd AUTH psuser pspass
|
|
|
|
$rd read
|
|
|
|
$rd SUBSCRIBE foo:1
|
|
|
|
assert_match {subscribe foo:1 1} [$rd read]
|
|
|
|
$rd SUBSCRIBE bar:2
|
|
|
|
assert_match {subscribe bar:2 2} [$rd read]
|
|
|
|
$rd SUBSCRIBE zap:3
|
|
|
|
catch {$rd read} e
|
|
|
|
set e
|
|
|
|
} {*NOPERM*channel*}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
test {It's possible to allow subscribing to a subset of channel patterns} {
|
|
|
|
set rd [redis_deferring_client]
|
|
|
|
$rd AUTH psuser pspass
|
|
|
|
$rd read
|
|
|
|
$rd PSUBSCRIBE foo:1
|
|
|
|
assert_match {psubscribe foo:1 1} [$rd read]
|
|
|
|
$rd PSUBSCRIBE bar:*
|
|
|
|
assert_match {psubscribe bar:\* 2} [$rd read]
|
|
|
|
$rd PSUBSCRIBE bar:baz
|
|
|
|
catch {$rd read} e
|
|
|
|
set e
|
|
|
|
} {*NOPERM*channel*}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
test {Subscribers are killed when revoked of channel permission} {
|
|
|
|
set rd [redis_deferring_client]
|
|
|
|
r ACL setuser psuser resetchannels &foo:1
|
|
|
|
$rd AUTH psuser pspass
|
|
|
|
$rd CLIENT SETNAME deathrow
|
|
|
|
$rd SUBSCRIBE foo:1
|
|
|
|
r ACL setuser psuser resetchannels
|
|
|
|
assert_no_match {*deathrow*} [r CLIENT LIST]
|
|
|
|
$rd close
|
|
|
|
} {0}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
test {Subscribers are killed when revoked of pattern permission} {
|
|
|
|
set rd [redis_deferring_client]
|
|
|
|
r ACL setuser psuser resetchannels &bar:*
|
|
|
|
$rd AUTH psuser pspass
|
|
|
|
$rd CLIENT SETNAME deathrow
|
|
|
|
$rd PSUBSCRIBE bar:*
|
|
|
|
r ACL setuser psuser resetchannels
|
|
|
|
assert_no_match {*deathrow*} [r CLIENT LIST]
|
|
|
|
$rd close
|
|
|
|
} {0}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
test {Subscribers are pardoned if literal permissions are retained and/or gaining allchannels} {
|
|
|
|
set rd [redis_deferring_client]
|
|
|
|
r ACL setuser psuser resetchannels &foo:1 &bar:*
|
|
|
|
$rd AUTH psuser pspass
|
|
|
|
$rd CLIENT SETNAME pardoned
|
|
|
|
$rd SUBSCRIBE foo:1
|
|
|
|
$rd PSUBSCRIBE bar:*
|
|
|
|
r ACL setuser psuser resetchannels &foo:1 &bar:* &baz:qaz &zoo:*
|
|
|
|
assert_match {*pardoned*} [r CLIENT LIST]
|
|
|
|
r ACL setuser psuser allchannels
|
|
|
|
assert_match {*pardoned*} [r CLIENT LIST]
|
|
|
|
$rd close
|
|
|
|
} {0}
|
|
|
|
|
2019-01-28 06:40:07 -05:00
|
|
|
test {Users can be configured to authenticate with any password} {
|
|
|
|
r ACL setuser newuser nopass
|
|
|
|
r AUTH newuser zipzapblabla
|
|
|
|
} {OK}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
test {ACLs can exclude single commands} {
|
|
|
|
r ACL setuser newuser -ping
|
|
|
|
r INCR mycounter ; # Should not raise an error
|
|
|
|
catch {r PING} e
|
|
|
|
set e
|
|
|
|
} {*NOPERM*}
|
|
|
|
|
2019-09-17 06:32:35 -04:00
|
|
|
test {ACLs can include or exclude whole classes of commands} {
|
2019-01-28 06:40:07 -05:00
|
|
|
r ACL setuser newuser -@all +@set +acl
|
|
|
|
r SADD myset a b c; # Should not raise an error
|
|
|
|
r ACL setuser newuser +@all -@string
|
|
|
|
r SADD myset a b c; # Again should not raise an error
|
|
|
|
# String commands instead should raise an error
|
|
|
|
catch {r SET foo bar} e
|
|
|
|
r ACL setuser newuser allcommands; # Undo commands ACL
|
|
|
|
set e
|
|
|
|
} {*NOPERM*}
|
2019-01-28 12:29:22 -05:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
test {ACLs can include single subcommands} {
|
|
|
|
r ACL setuser newuser +@all -client
|
|
|
|
r ACL setuser newuser +client|id +client|setname
|
|
|
|
r CLIENT ID; # Should not fail
|
|
|
|
r CLIENT SETNAME foo ; # Should not fail
|
|
|
|
catch {r CLIENT KILL type master} e
|
|
|
|
set e
|
|
|
|
} {*NOPERM*}
|
2019-01-30 06:01:23 -05:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# Note that the order of the generated ACL rules is not stable in Redis
|
|
|
|
# so we need to match the different parts and not as a whole string.
|
|
|
|
test {ACL GETUSER is able to translate back command permissions} {
|
|
|
|
# Subtractive
|
|
|
|
r ACL setuser newuser reset +@all ~* -@string +incr -debug +debug|digest
|
|
|
|
set cmdstr [dict get [r ACL getuser newuser] commands]
|
|
|
|
assert_match {*+@all*} $cmdstr
|
|
|
|
assert_match {*-@string*} $cmdstr
|
|
|
|
assert_match {*+incr*} $cmdstr
|
|
|
|
assert_match {*-debug +debug|digest**} $cmdstr
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# Additive
|
|
|
|
r ACL setuser newuser reset +@string -incr +acl +debug|digest +debug|segfault
|
|
|
|
set cmdstr [dict get [r ACL getuser newuser] commands]
|
|
|
|
assert_match {*-@all*} $cmdstr
|
|
|
|
assert_match {*+@string*} $cmdstr
|
|
|
|
assert_match {*-incr*} $cmdstr
|
|
|
|
assert_match {*+debug|digest*} $cmdstr
|
|
|
|
assert_match {*+debug|segfault*} $cmdstr
|
|
|
|
assert_match {*+acl*} $cmdstr
|
|
|
|
}
|
2019-04-08 12:06:50 -04:00
|
|
|
|
2020-10-08 01:09:09 -04:00
|
|
|
# A regression test make sure that as long as there is a simple
|
|
|
|
# category defining the commands, that it will be used as is.
|
|
|
|
test {ACL GETUSER provides reasonable results} {
|
2020-10-27 00:23:30 -04:00
|
|
|
set categories [r ACL CAT]
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# Test that adding each single category will
|
|
|
|
# result in just that category with both +@all and -@all
|
|
|
|
foreach category $categories {
|
|
|
|
# Test for future commands where allowed
|
|
|
|
r ACL setuser additive reset +@all "-@$category"
|
|
|
|
set cmdstr [dict get [r ACL getuser additive] commands]
|
|
|
|
assert_equal "+@all -@$category" $cmdstr
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# Test for future commands where disallowed
|
|
|
|
r ACL setuser restrictive reset -@all "+@$category"
|
|
|
|
set cmdstr [dict get [r ACL getuser restrictive] commands]
|
|
|
|
assert_equal "-@all +@$category" $cmdstr
|
|
|
|
}
|
2020-10-08 01:09:09 -04:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2019-04-08 12:08:37 -04:00
|
|
|
test {ACL #5998 regression: memory leaks adding / removing subcommands} {
|
2019-04-08 12:06:50 -04:00
|
|
|
r AUTH default ""
|
|
|
|
r ACL setuser newuser reset -debug +debug|a +debug|b +debug|c
|
|
|
|
r ACL setuser newuser -debug
|
|
|
|
# The test framework will detect a leak if any.
|
|
|
|
}
|
2020-01-30 05:09:50 -05:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
test {ACL LOG shows failed command executions at toplevel} {
|
|
|
|
r ACL LOG RESET
|
|
|
|
r ACL setuser antirez >foo on +set ~object:1234
|
|
|
|
r ACL setuser antirez +eval +multi +exec
|
Adds pub/sub channel patterns to ACL (#7993)
Fixes #7923.
This PR appropriates the special `&` symbol (because `@` and `*` are taken),
followed by a literal value or pattern for describing the Pub/Sub patterns that
an ACL user can interact with. It is similar to the existing key patterns
mechanism in function (additive) and implementation (copy-pasta). It also adds
the allchannels and resetchannels ACL keywords, naturally.
The default user is given allchannels permissions, whereas new users get
whatever is defined by the acl-pubsub-default configuration directive. For
backward compatibility in 6.2, the default of this directive is allchannels but
this is likely to be changed to resetchannels in the next major version for
stronger default security settings.
Unless allchannels is set for the user, channel access permissions are checked
as follows :
* Calls to both PUBLISH and SUBSCRIBE will fail unless a pattern matching the
argumentative channel name(s) exists for the user.
* Calls to PSUBSCRIBE will fail unless the pattern(s) provided as an argument
literally exist(s) in the user's list.
Such failures are logged to the ACL log.
Runtime changes to channel permissions for a user with existing subscribing
clients cause said clients to disconnect unless the new permissions permit the
connections to continue. Note, however, that PSUBSCRIBErs' patterns are matched
literally, so given the change bar:* -> b*, pattern subscribers to bar:* will be
disconnected.
Notes/questions:
* UNSUBSCRIBE, PUNSUBSCRIBE and PUBSUB remain unprotected due to lack of reasons
for touching them.
2020-12-01 07:21:39 -05:00
|
|
|
r ACL setuser antirez resetchannels +publish
|
2020-01-30 05:09:50 -05:00
|
|
|
r AUTH antirez foo
|
|
|
|
catch {r GET foo}
|
|
|
|
r AUTH default ""
|
|
|
|
set entry [lindex [r ACL LOG] 0]
|
|
|
|
assert {[dict get $entry username] eq {antirez}}
|
|
|
|
assert {[dict get $entry context] eq {toplevel}}
|
|
|
|
assert {[dict get $entry reason] eq {command}}
|
|
|
|
assert {[dict get $entry object] eq {get}}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
test {ACL LOG is able to test similar events} {
|
|
|
|
r AUTH antirez foo
|
|
|
|
catch {r GET foo}
|
|
|
|
catch {r GET foo}
|
|
|
|
catch {r GET foo}
|
|
|
|
r AUTH default ""
|
|
|
|
set entry [lindex [r ACL LOG] 0]
|
|
|
|
assert {[dict get $entry count] == 4}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
test {ACL LOG is able to log keys access violations and key name} {
|
|
|
|
r AUTH antirez foo
|
|
|
|
catch {r SET somekeynotallowed 1234}
|
|
|
|
r AUTH default ""
|
|
|
|
set entry [lindex [r ACL LOG] 0]
|
|
|
|
assert {[dict get $entry reason] eq {key}}
|
|
|
|
assert {[dict get $entry object] eq {somekeynotallowed}}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
Adds pub/sub channel patterns to ACL (#7993)
Fixes #7923.
This PR appropriates the special `&` symbol (because `@` and `*` are taken),
followed by a literal value or pattern for describing the Pub/Sub patterns that
an ACL user can interact with. It is similar to the existing key patterns
mechanism in function (additive) and implementation (copy-pasta). It also adds
the allchannels and resetchannels ACL keywords, naturally.
The default user is given allchannels permissions, whereas new users get
whatever is defined by the acl-pubsub-default configuration directive. For
backward compatibility in 6.2, the default of this directive is allchannels but
this is likely to be changed to resetchannels in the next major version for
stronger default security settings.
Unless allchannels is set for the user, channel access permissions are checked
as follows :
* Calls to both PUBLISH and SUBSCRIBE will fail unless a pattern matching the
argumentative channel name(s) exists for the user.
* Calls to PSUBSCRIBE will fail unless the pattern(s) provided as an argument
literally exist(s) in the user's list.
Such failures are logged to the ACL log.
Runtime changes to channel permissions for a user with existing subscribing
clients cause said clients to disconnect unless the new permissions permit the
connections to continue. Note, however, that PSUBSCRIBErs' patterns are matched
literally, so given the change bar:* -> b*, pattern subscribers to bar:* will be
disconnected.
Notes/questions:
* UNSUBSCRIBE, PUNSUBSCRIBE and PUBSUB remain unprotected due to lack of reasons
for touching them.
2020-12-01 07:21:39 -05:00
|
|
|
test {ACL LOG is able to log channel access violations and channel name} {
|
|
|
|
r AUTH antirez foo
|
|
|
|
catch {r PUBLISH somechannelnotallowed nullmsg}
|
|
|
|
r AUTH default ""
|
|
|
|
set entry [lindex [r ACL LOG] 0]
|
|
|
|
assert {[dict get $entry reason] eq {channel}}
|
|
|
|
assert {[dict get $entry object] eq {somechannelnotallowed}}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2020-01-30 05:09:50 -05:00
|
|
|
test {ACL LOG RESET is able to flush the entries in the log} {
|
|
|
|
r ACL LOG RESET
|
|
|
|
assert {[llength [r ACL LOG]] == 0}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
test {ACL LOG can distinguish the transaction context (1)} {
|
|
|
|
r AUTH antirez foo
|
|
|
|
r MULTI
|
|
|
|
catch {r INCR foo}
|
|
|
|
catch {r EXEC}
|
|
|
|
r AUTH default ""
|
|
|
|
set entry [lindex [r ACL LOG] 0]
|
|
|
|
assert {[dict get $entry context] eq {multi}}
|
|
|
|
assert {[dict get $entry object] eq {incr}}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
test {ACL LOG can distinguish the transaction context (2)} {
|
|
|
|
set rd1 [redis_deferring_client]
|
|
|
|
r ACL SETUSER antirez +incr
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
r AUTH antirez foo
|
|
|
|
r MULTI
|
|
|
|
r INCR object:1234
|
|
|
|
$rd1 ACL SETUSER antirez -incr
|
|
|
|
$rd1 read
|
|
|
|
catch {r EXEC}
|
|
|
|
$rd1 close
|
|
|
|
r AUTH default ""
|
|
|
|
set entry [lindex [r ACL LOG] 0]
|
|
|
|
assert {[dict get $entry context] eq {multi}}
|
|
|
|
assert {[dict get $entry object] eq {incr}}
|
|
|
|
r ACL SETUSER antirez -incr
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
test {ACL can log errors in the context of Lua scripting} {
|
|
|
|
r AUTH antirez foo
|
|
|
|
catch {r EVAL {redis.call('incr','foo')} 0}
|
|
|
|
r AUTH default ""
|
|
|
|
set entry [lindex [r ACL LOG] 0]
|
|
|
|
assert {[dict get $entry context] eq {lua}}
|
|
|
|
assert {[dict get $entry object] eq {incr}}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
test {ACL LOG can accept a numerical argument to show less entries} {
|
|
|
|
r AUTH antirez foo
|
|
|
|
catch {r INCR foo}
|
|
|
|
catch {r INCR foo}
|
|
|
|
catch {r INCR foo}
|
|
|
|
catch {r INCR foo}
|
|
|
|
r AUTH default ""
|
|
|
|
assert {[llength [r ACL LOG]] > 1}
|
|
|
|
assert {[llength [r ACL LOG 2]] == 2}
|
|
|
|
}
|
2020-02-04 06:58:48 -05:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
test {ACL LOG can log failed auth attempts} {
|
|
|
|
catch {r AUTH antirez wrong-password}
|
|
|
|
set entry [lindex [r ACL LOG] 0]
|
|
|
|
assert {[dict get $entry context] eq {toplevel}}
|
|
|
|
assert {[dict get $entry reason] eq {auth}}
|
|
|
|
assert {[dict get $entry object] eq {AUTH}}
|
|
|
|
assert {[dict get $entry username] eq {antirez}}
|
|
|
|
}
|
2020-02-04 07:19:40 -05:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
test {ACL LOG entries are limited to a maximum amount} {
|
|
|
|
r ACL LOG RESET
|
|
|
|
r CONFIG SET acllog-max-len 5
|
|
|
|
r AUTH antirez foo
|
|
|
|
for {set j 0} {$j < 10} {incr j} {
|
|
|
|
catch {r SET obj:$j 123}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
r AUTH default ""
|
|
|
|
assert {[llength [r ACL LOG]] == 5}
|
|
|
|
}
|
2020-03-20 07:52:06 -04:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
test {When default user is off, new connections are not authenticated} {
|
|
|
|
r ACL setuser default off
|
|
|
|
catch {set rd1 [redis_deferring_client]} e
|
|
|
|
r ACL setuser default on
|
|
|
|
set e
|
|
|
|
} {*NOAUTH*}
|
2020-07-15 05:38:22 -04:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
test {ACL HELP should not have unexpected options} {
|
|
|
|
catch {r ACL help xxx} e
|
|
|
|
assert_match "*Unknown subcommand or wrong number of arguments*" $e
|
|
|
|
}
|
Don't write replies if close the client ASAP (#7202)
Before this commit, we would have continued to add replies to the reply buffer even if client
output buffer limit is reached, so the used memory would keep increasing over the configured limit.
What's more, we shouldn’t write any reply to the client if it is set 'CLIENT_CLOSE_ASAP' flag
because that doesn't conform to its definition and we will close all clients flagged with
'CLIENT_CLOSE_ASAP' in ‘beforeSleep’.
Because of code execution order, before this, we may firstly write to part of the replies to
the socket before disconnecting it, but in fact, we may can’t send the full replies to clients
since OS socket buffer is limited. But this unexpected behavior makes some commands work well,
for instance ACL DELUSER, if the client deletes the current user, we need to send reply to client
and close the connection, but before, we close the client firstly and write the reply to reply
buffer. secondly, we shouldn't do this despite the fact it works well in most cases.
We add a flag 'CLIENT_CLOSE_AFTER_COMMAND' to mark clients, this flag means we will close the
client after executing commands and send all entire replies, so that we can write replies to
reply buffer during executing commands, send replies to clients, and close them later.
We also fix some implicit problems. If client output buffer limit is enforced in 'multi/exec',
all commands will be executed completely in redis and clients will not read any reply instead of
partial replies. Even more, if the client executes 'ACL deluser' the using user in 'multi/exec',
it will not read the replies after 'ACL deluser' just like before executing 'client kill' itself
in 'multi/exec'.
We added some tests for output buffer limit breach during multi-exec and using a pipeline of
many small commands rather than one with big response.
Co-authored-by: Oran Agra <oran@redislabs.com>
2020-09-24 09:01:41 -04:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
test {Delete a user that the client doesn't use} {
|
|
|
|
r ACL setuser not_used on >passwd
|
|
|
|
assert {[r ACL deluser not_used] == 1}
|
|
|
|
# The client is not closed
|
|
|
|
assert {[r ping] eq {PONG}}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
test {Delete a user that the client is using} {
|
|
|
|
r ACL setuser using on +acl >passwd
|
|
|
|
r AUTH using passwd
|
|
|
|
# The client will receive reply normally
|
|
|
|
assert {[r ACL deluser using] == 1}
|
|
|
|
# The client is closed
|
|
|
|
catch {[r ping]} e
|
|
|
|
assert_match "*I/O error*" $e
|
|
|
|
}
|
2019-01-28 05:39:58 -05:00
|
|
|
}
|
2020-09-09 10:13:35 -04:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
set server_path [tmpdir "server.acl"]
|
|
|
|
exec cp -f tests/assets/user.acl $server_path
|
|
|
|
start_server [list overrides [list "dir" $server_path "aclfile" "user.acl"]] {
|
|
|
|
# user alice on allcommands allkeys >alice
|
|
|
|
# user bob on -@all +@set +acl ~set* >bob
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
test "Alice: can excute all command" {
|
|
|
|
r AUTH alice alice
|
|
|
|
assert_equal "alice" [r acl whoami]
|
|
|
|
r SET key value
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
test "Bob: just excute @set and acl command" {
|
|
|
|
r AUTH bob bob
|
|
|
|
assert_equal "bob" [r acl whoami]
|
|
|
|
assert_equal "3" [r sadd set 1 2 3]
|
|
|
|
catch {r SET key value} e
|
|
|
|
set e
|
|
|
|
} {*NOPERM*}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
test "ACL load and save" {
|
|
|
|
r ACL setuser eve +get allkeys >eve on
|
|
|
|
r ACL save
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# ACL load will free user and kill clients
|
|
|
|
r ACL load
|
|
|
|
catch {r ACL LIST} e
|
|
|
|
assert_match {*I/O error*} $e
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
reconnect
|
|
|
|
r AUTH alice alice
|
|
|
|
r SET key value
|
|
|
|
r AUTH eve eve
|
|
|
|
r GET key
|
|
|
|
catch {r SET key value} e
|
|
|
|
set e
|
|
|
|
} {*NOPERM*}
|
|
|
|
}
|